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Elephant Docs

Elephant Docs

Misaligned Incentives and Principal-Agent

Service provider incentives are to design a system which forces repeated verification, redundant intermediaries, and inefficient processes across every transaction. Lack of data memory forces full re-verification of title, appraisal, inspection, lien, and servicing data on every transaction. Fragmented systems require repeated aggregation and reconciliation across approximately 17 counterparties per transaction.

If you buy a house today and try to sell it tomorrow, you have to totally start over and pay for everything again. This should be trivially easy to do, yet the current system makes it impossibly expensive. No service providers have the incentive to provide a better product at a lower cost. The absence of reputation tracking allows repeated use of low-quality vendors and intermediaries without market penalties. Bad actors thrive in the shadows of information asymmetry, protected by the same opacity that enables systemic extraction.